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THE PERFORMANCE OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN SOUTH AFRICA. 
ZAMBIA AND ZIMBABWE DURING THE LAST lWO DECADES 
1. Introduction 
In the literature on the economics of less developed countries ("LDCS"), the role 
of the state in economic development has been substantially devalued over the last 
two decades. On the other hand, the 1990s have heralded a less hostile view of 
the state's involvement in the economy than that which prevailed in the previous 
decade. The World Bank's 1991 World Development Report attempts to 
summarise the professional consensus not by reference to any neoclassical writer, 
but by quoting Keynes: 'The important thing for government is not to do things 
which individuals are doing already, and to do them a little better or a little 
worse; but to do those things which at present are not done at all."1 The problem 
with this apparently unobjectionable approach is that in many LDCs a vast array 
of economic activities present in the industrialised nations "are not done at all." 
Perhaps that is why the World Bank's own interpretation of Keynes' words (which, 
incidentally, were obviously not intended to refer to LDCs) stretches them 
somewhat: tt[I]ntervention by the public sector is not undesirable in itself. On the 
contrary, many sorts of intervention are essential if economies are to achieve their 
full potential. An abbreviated list of indispensable interventions would include the 
maintenance of law and order, the provision of public goods, investments in 
human capital, the construction and repair of physical infrastructure, and the 
protection of the environment. In all these areas (and arguably more) markets 
'fail ' and the government must step in. But the countless cases of unsuccessful 
intervention suggest the need for caution. Markets fail, but so do governments. 
To justify intervention it is not enough to know that the market is failing; it is also 
necessary to be confident that the government can do better."2 
The mere fact that countries in Sub-Saharan Africa ("Africatt) are relatively 
underdeveloped would thus lead one to expect greater state involvement in the 
economy. And, indeed, this is the essence of Gerschenkron's notion of 
institutional substitutability. As Iliffe puts Gerschenkron's argument, tt[t]he later 
a country industrialise[s], ... the more politically directed [is] its industrial 
IThe World Bank, World Development Report 1991 (Washington, D.C.1991), 
p.128. 
2Ibid., p.13l. 
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revolution.,,3 Taking the thesis down to the country level, one would expect 
significantly less state involvement in Zimbabwe than in Zambia, and somewhat 
less in South Africa than in Zimbabwe. We shall see how these predictions 
square with the experience of South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe (collectively, 
the "Region") over the last two decades when we turn to some of the evidence in 
Section 5 below. The Gerschenkronian argument raises several questions and 
some of these are worth considering in light of experience in the Region: Is there 
a natural tendency for the role of the state in the economy to diminish as a 
country becomes more industrialised, independent of how late the country began 
its process of industrialisation and how involved the state was in that process to 
begin with? If not, should such a "withering away" of the state be encouraged in 
the later stages of industrialisation in order for the process to continue? If so, 
what is the appropriate stage of industrialisation at which this should occur? 
These themes are present, albeit implicitly, throughout much of this paper. Their 
economic policy aspects, including policy experience in the Region during the 
1980s, are more explicitly dealt with in Sections 8 and 9 below. 
How does one evaluate the effects of state intervention in the economy? While 
the Gerschenkronian and 1991 World Bank analyses may lead us to expect a large 
degree of state intervention in African economies, the appropriate extent of that 
intervention is impossible to define a priori. Moreover, many interventions by the 
state have non-commercial objectives (the promotion of inter-regional or inter-
personal income equality, for example) and their impact is difficult to measure. 
We should, however, expect that African states will be heavily involved in business 
activities that in more developed economies would be undertaken by capitalists. 
When it comes to those activities, it becomes feasible and interesting to ask 
questions about their financial performance. Are they profitable, and have they 
become more or less so over time? How have the actions of policy makers 
affected their performance? What does this suggest for policy in the future? 
Even though criteria relating to financial performance are clearly not the only 
ones to be considered in the evaluation of state-run businesses (as mentioned 
earlier in this paragraph and as we shall see below, especially in Sections 2 and 
3), they must play a central part therein. In this way it becomes possible to ask 
whether business conducted by the state can be more efficiently run or, indeed, 
whether it is socially desirable to encourage the private sector to undertake such 
business instead. 
In performing such an assessment, the ideal technique would be to evaluate each 
"state-owned enterprise" or "public enterprise" ("PE") separately. But, as we shall 
see, the data is simply not available for such scrutiny. A starting point on this 
route is, however, to attempt to build an aggregate picture of the PE sector in a 
country and make some judgments about its performance. In the process, one of 
3John Iliffe, The Emergence of African Capitalism (1983), p.64. 
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the benefits will be to identify data that are currently not collected but should be 
if individual PEs and hence also PE sectors are to be adequately monitored and 
evaluated. At the same time, we can make some progress toward cross-country 
comparisons of PE sector performance and toward comparisons of PE sector and 
private sector performance. These are the directions in which this paper takes 
some preliminary steps. 
The paper is organised into nine further sections. Section 2 introduces the 
principal topics studied in the paper. It also sets forth the rationale for the choice 
of period under consideration and raises some issues concerning the differences 
in experience between the 1970s and the 1980s, the latter being a theme picked 
up throughout the paper. Section 3 provides an historical context for the 
establishment of PEs and reminds us that there are reasons unrelated to the 
criteria examined in this paper for such establishment. Section 4 contains some 
comments about the considerable limitations of the data relevant to the subject 
matter of the paper. Section 5 provides an overview of the size of the PE sector 
in the Region. Section 6 assesses the financial performance of the sector. Section 
7 examines the impact of the PE sector on government finances and credit 
markets. Section 8 reviews the principal determinants of PE performance and 
describes programmes aimed at reforming the PE sector. Section 9 reviews the 
experience of PE reform in the Region. Section 10 contains brief concluding 
remarks. The Tables and Figures referred to in the text are presented at the end 
of the paper, followed by a Bibliography. 
2. PEs in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Zambia: Issues from the Last Two 
Decades 
PEs have made an important contribution to output, investment and employment 
in most African countries. Several recent studies suggest, however, that PEs have 
not used resources efficiently and that they have imposed a burden on public 
finances.4 As Short puts it, "[t]here is a growing awareness that public enterprises 
can be a major source of macroeconomic problems ... There is, however, a 
shortage of analytical work on the macroeconomic role and impact of public 
enterprises. A principal reason for this is the scarcity and inadequacy of data on 
4See, for example: John. R. Nellis, Public Enterprises in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(World Bank Discussion Paper Number 1, Washington, D.e. 1986); R.P. Short, 
"The Role of Public Enterprises: An International Statistical Comparison" in R.H. 
F10yd et. al. (eds.), Public Enterprises in Mixed Economies (Washington, D.e. 
1984); Daniel Swanson and Teferra Wolde-Semait, Africa's Public Enterprise 
Sector and Evidence of Reforms (World Bank Technical Paper Number 95, 
Washington, D.e. 1989). 
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public enterprises."s 
Short's own paper then goes on to collect available evidence on PEs in 90 
countries. He concludes that "the commercial return and saving of public 
enterprises is generally low.,,6 Nellis, and Swanson & Wolde-Semait have drawn 
similar conclusions for Africa as a whole. Nellis, writing about the situation in the 
mid-1980s, ends his paper by saying that "[t]he reform of public enterprise sectors 
is now everywhere in Africa a matter of the highest priority. The reform effort 
will be lengthy and expensive, and will demand much from both African 
governments and the development assistance community.,,7 Writing more 
recently, Swanson & Wolde-Semait opine that "[o]verall , positive steps have been 
taken to create a sound policy environment in countries with reform programs. 
However, further actions are needed to improve performance and rationalize the 
content of the sector. Thus, continued liquidation, divestiture, and re-habilitation, 
as an integral part of PE sector reform, provide a dual and compatible approach. 
Institutional and legal reforms for the sector continue to be crucial to ensure PE 
autonomy and efficiency in the long term."g 
The general issue addressed in this paper is to what extent the above 
shortcomings have been true of PEs in the Region. It appears that no study 
assessing the impact of PEs in Southern Africa has been made and this paper 
represents a first step towards filling that gap. The purpose of the paper is to 
present preliminary and tentative findings on sector size, financial flows (including 
PE performance and financing), resource usage, and the extent of reform efforts 
in the Region. 
The paper looks at the financial performance of PEs in South Africa, Zimbabwe 
and Zambia over as much of the last two decades as data will allow. These three 
countries were selected both because of the large size of their economies relative 
to others in Southern Africa and because relatively better data are available for 
them. The time period was chosen because all three countries initiated efforts at 
reforming their PE sectors in the 1980s in response to shortcomings in 
performance in the context of sagging commodity prices, large increases in debt 
burdens and rising interest rates. It therefore seemed interesting to try and obtain 
sufficient evidence to judge whether the reform efforts had led to any 
SShort, op. cit. , p.ll0. 
6Ibid., p.180. 
7Nellis, op. cit., p.65. 
gSwanson & Wolde-Semait, op. cit. , p.33. 
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improvements in performance.9 
The paper sets out to answer the following two questions: 
(a) How have PEs performed financially over the last two decades and what 
has their impact been on government finances, domestic and foreign credit supply, 
and resource allocation in the economies concerned? 
(b) How has their performance been affected by the reform efforts of the 
1980s? 
In doing so, the following preliminary questions have also been considered: 
(i) What is the scope of the PE sector in the Region and how has this changed 
over the last two decades? 
(ii) What measures to reform PEs have been implemented by countries in the 
Region? 
3. Reasons for the Establishment of PEs in the Region 
"Public corporations are a direct result of growing nationalism in many developing 
countries. The emergence of public corporations was perhaps the most important 
occurrence during the twentieth century."1O While the second sentence of this 
statement is obviously open to a little doubt, it is certainly true that political 
nationalism played a large role in the establishment of PEs in South Africa and 
Zambia. And in all three countries, the state has attempted to contribute to the 
process of industrialisation and economic growth by direct intelVention in the 
economy. 
In South Africa, the election to power of the National Party in 1948 heralded a 
drive for economic empowerment by Afrikaners. During the 1950s Afrikaner 
nationalists used their control of the state to increase their share in an expanding 
9Having proceeded on this basis to collect data relating essentially to the 
period after 1970, I was startled to discover that I could in any event not have 
examined much earlier information, since it generally does not exist. The earliest 
data point contained in Tables II to VI is for 1968, and precious few of any 
consequence were available to me for earlier dates. 
IOJonathan H. Chileshe, Third World Countries and Development Options: 
ZAMBIA (New Delhi, 1986), p.l25. 
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economy. Although the establishment of PEs pre-dated National Party rule, 
between 1946 and 1973 public sector investment rose tenfold. This vast expansion 
of PEs greatly assisted Afrikaner economic advancement. Afrikaners were able 
to use the state to create industries that would not only provide good jobs for 
white workers, but would also permit the marshalling of national resources by the 
state itself rather than by private capital (which was dominated by English-
speakers). Devices such as interlocking directorates between PEs and the private 
sector ensured the emergence by the late 1970s of a new class of Afrikaner 
entrepreneurs who could compete successfully with their English-speaking 
peers.l\ 
In Zimbabwe, as in so many other countries, the exigencies of the Second World 
War led to the nationalisation of industries like iron and steel in an effort to 
ensure that strategic supplies were delivered to the market in sufficient quantities. 
Zimbabwe is unusual in that many of the industries created or nationalised by the 
state during the Second World War were sold to more efficient private investors 
(often South African and British) soon after the War. On the other hand, the 
state did subsequently make extensive forays into areas like transport, for example 
by acquiring the railway system in 1947 as part of a policy designed to establish 
"a basis on which private enterprise can then build its own industry."12 In all, the 
state continued to own a substantial proportion of industry, a situation reinforced 
by international sanctions applied to Zimbabwe after the Unilateral Declaration 
of Independence ("UDI") in 1965. Since independence in 1980, the government 
has effectively left intact much of the inherited structure of ownership, with 
predominantly private ownership of the productive sectors and an extensive 
multinational presence. 13 
Of the three countries in the Region, Zambia is most typical of the pattern in 
Africa. It was left by the British with relatively little industry at independence in 
1964 and embarked on a programme of import substituting industrialisation in a 
bid to diversify the economy and create national "self-sufficiency." In the 1970s, 
relying on revenues generated by the copper boom of the early part of the decade, 
Zambia established an economic structure based on extensive state ownership, 
together with government intervention and controls over almost all aspects of the 
economy. This policy regime was maintained and intensified following the 
llShula Marks and Stanley Trapido, "South Africa since 1976: an Historical 
Perspective" in Shaun lohnson (ed.), South Africa: No Turning Back (1988), p.8. 
12Ian Phimister, An Economic and Social HistOlY of Zimbabwe 1890-1948: 
Capital Accumulation and Class Struggle (1988), p.252. 
13The World Bank, Trends in Developing Economies 1990 (Washington, D.e. 
1990), p.617. 
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collapse of copper prices in 1975, with the government resorting to heavy foreign 
borrowing to stave off the effects of deepening recession. A build-up of external 
debt occurred that now burdens the economy.14 
The point about the non-commercial ambitions touched on above is that they 
feature prominently in decisions to establish and maintain PEs, but the extent to 
which they have been achieved is often difficult to measure. Even those 
susceptible to measurement have not, however, been dealt with in this paper, 
which is concerned with financial performance. So, for example, employment 
creation is a major objective in the establishment of many PEs. PEs established 
in labour surplus countries pursuant to cost-benefit analyses using a shadow wage 
rate below that of the market wage will tend to labour intensity, which mayor 
may not undermine their profitability. In this paper, we are mainly concerned 
with questions relating to the latter issue. This is not to deny that employment 
creation is a legitimate objective. The emphasis ofthe paper does, however, imply 
that the achievement of non-commercial aims at the expense of profitability may 
ultimately be self-defeating. 
As indicated in Section 1, the rationale underlying the establishment of PEs has 
often been that the private sector will not fulfil the function for which they are 
required. Clearly, this has often been so in the Region. We can, however, 
legitimately ask whether this Gerschenkronian process begins to reverse itself at 
some stage. When a (capitalist) country reaches a certain degree of 
industrialisation, is there a tendency for public ownership to start shrinking 
relative to private ownership?15 If so, what is the magic level and are South 
Africa and Zimbabwe, for example, near to it? If they were, and the share of 
public ownership was increasing, it would be reasonable to start looking for 
perverse government policies which encouraged such a process. These are very 
large and complex questions and are not directly addressed in this paper. They 
are superficially touched upon only in so far as we are concerned, in Section 5, to 
identify changes in the size of the PE sector. 
14Ibid., p.610. 
151n this context, it is interesting to note that in industrial countries the shares 
of PEs in output and capital formation actually fell between the early 1960s and 
the end of the 1970s (although by only half a percentage point in each case). For 
developing countries, the share of PEs in GDP rose by 4 1/2 percentage points 
between the late 1960s and the end of the 1970s and the share in investment 
increased by 10 1/2 percentage points. (Short, op. cit. , p.124.) Increases in the 
size of the PE sector were especially marked in Africa (Short, op. cit. , p.124) and 
were largely attributable to the efforts (touched upon in Section 3) by African 
governments to promote industrialisation and economic self-sufficiency. 
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4. The Data; Changes Therein During the Last Two Decades 
In this paper, the focus is on those economically important, quasi-independent 
entities which African governments have created to do what they feel their private 
sectors cannot do, are not doing or should not do. Where statistics are available, 
they tend in any event to relate to this category of enterprises, so that there is also 
a practical reason for preferring it. PEs are commonly defined for reporting 
purposes as government owned or controlled enterprises which are distinct legal 
entities, engaged in business activities and supposed to earn the bulk of their 
revenues from sales. To be more specific, country accounts generally use the 
definition of Non-financial Public Enterprises (Corporate and Quasi-corporate) 
contained in the United Nations publication, A System of National Accounts 
("SNA"). The SNA definition reads, in part, as follows: "Publicly owned andlor 
controlled enterprises primarily engaged in non-financial activities which are (i) 
incorporated public corporations ... or (ii) large unincorporated units (government 
enterprises) that sell most of the goods or non-financial services they produce to 
the public."16 The International Monetary Fund's A Manual on Government 
Finance Statistics (the "Manual") comments as follows on the definition: 
"Corporate nonfinancial public enterprises are those recognized as business 
entities independent of their owners by virtue of legislation, administrative 
regulations, or registration. Quasi-corporate nonfinancial public enterprises are 
generally expected to have complete profit and loss statements and complete 
balance sheet accounts on the financial assets and liabilities, as well as the real 
assets, involved in the business; however, they may also include government 
agencies which are mainly engaged in selling industrial or commercial goods and 
services to the public on a large scale without maintaining these accounts." The 
Manual goes on to explain that "[n]onfinancial public enterprises are thus 
bounded on one side by departmental enterprises, which are unincorporated or 
are not mainly engaged in selling industrial or commercial goods and services to 
the public on a large scale, and on the other by private enterprises, which are not 
entirely or mainly government-owned andlor government-controlled.,,17 
This paper relies mainly on data relating to Non-financial Public Enterprises. 
Financial public enterprises, enterprises run by government departments, and 
regulatory agencies and statutory boards are thus generally outside of the scope 
of the paper, although they sometimes enter into the accounting definitions used 
by the countries and thus the data. Quite often countries use different definitions 
for different reporting purposes and there are certainly variations among countries 
in the way data are gathered with respect to PEs. In short, it has not been 
llYJbe United Nations, A System of National Accounts (New York 1968), p.78. 
17The International Monetary Fund, A Manual on Government Finance 
Statistics (Washington, D.e. 1986), pp.20-21. 
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possible to use a single, consistent definition of PEs throughout the paper. I have, 
however, attempted to use the data in a comparative way only where it seems 
appropriate to do so. 
Anyone who has worked on this subject knows that relevant data are generally 
non-existent and at best incomplete, as the Tables and the notes thereto indicate. 
None of the international organisations publishes anything like comprehensive 
data on PEs and individual countries generally do not identify PE operations 
separately in their accounts. Even where data do exist, there are often large gaps 
in time series, making definitive statements about trends difficult. Moreover, it 
is far from clear how complete and accurate the available statistics are, since 
accounting for the PE sectors is by no means transparent or systematic. Also, as 
already indicated, data consistency over time and comparability across countries 
is problematic, due to varying accounting methods, definitions and diligence. 
Consequently, the statistics I have been able to uncover, with considerable 
assistance from the South African Central Statistical Service, the South African 
Office for Public Enterprises and Privatisation and the Zimbabwe Central 
Statistical Office (but with rather less cooperation from the Zambian Central 
Statistical Office, the Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation Limited 
("ZIMCO") and the Office of the Zambian Auditor-General), present only a very 
patchy picture of the PE sector in the Region. In part, this paper points to the 
need to collect the information contemplated herein in a thorough manner. 
Policy makers reading the paper will be able to judge for themselves how useful 
it would be if they could feel secure about the reliability of such information. 
As a glance at the Tables and Figures will show, the quality of many statistics 
relevant to this paper has been comparatively high since the mid-1970s in 
Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwe Central Statistical Office is nonetheless conscious of 
the need for better data on the economy and seems to have improved its 
collection and presentation thereof in the last three or four years, although I am 
not aware of any special effort with respect to PEs in this regard. In South 
Africa, where data collection is generally fairly good, not a great deal of statistics 
on PEs were available until the mid-1980s. The South African Office for Public 
Enterprises and Privatisation is aware of the shortcomings of its data and has 
indicated that it has, together with the South African Central Statistical Service, 
launched what it described to me as "a small program to gather relevant 
information, which may require considerable time and effort." In Zambia the 
quality of many statistics was quite reasonable during the 1970s and the first half 
of the 1980s, but appears to have deteriorated since. 
Quite apart from the inadequacies of the actual data, there are two respects in 
which the figures presented in this paper understate the extent of government 
activity in the economy. The first is that, as described above, certain government 
enterprises are specifically excluded from the definition of PEs. Secondly, even 
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within the definition of PEs, the paper generally addresses only enterprises owned 
or controlled by the central government. This is quite simply because while data 
are very poor at the central government level, they are considerably worse (i.e., 
generally non-existent) at the local government level.18 These points really do 
need constantly to be borne in mind. 
s. The Scope of the PE Sector in the Region; Changes Therein During the Last 
Two Decades 
Table I gives an idea of the principal industries in which PEs have been engaged 
in the Region. It is apparent that they have been involved to some extent in most 
of the important areas of economic activity in all three countries. 
The contribution of PEs to the economies of the Region is set out in Table 11, in 
terms of (a) numbers of PEs, (b) shares of GDP, (c) shares of investment and (d) 
percentages of labour force employed. 
In Zambia, the number of PEs actually increased during the 1980s. Similarly, 
while the PE sector's share of GDP fell from 35.0% to 26.8% between 1981 and 
1982, it then grew every year thereafter until 1985 (when our data set ends), 
indicating the weakness of the PE reform programme (discussed in Section 9). 
The PE sector's share of investment rose from about 50% in the early 1970s to 
over 60% by the end of the decade. It declined substantially in the early 1980s, 
18Such data as are available suggest that there may be respects in which the 
impact of PEs at the local government level are significant, at least in South 
Africa and Zambia. So, for example, while current transfers from the Zambian 
central government to Non-financial PEs totalled 0.9, 0.9 and 1.1 million Zambian 
Kwacha in 1978, 1979 and 1980 respectively, the corresponding figures for local 
government were 7.6, 7.3 and 6.9 million Zambian Kwacha. On the other hand, 
subsidies from central government to Non-financial PEs were 24.0, 101.4 and 
194.7 million Zambian Kwacha in those years, while the corresponding figures for 
local government were only 1.0, 1.5 and 0.05 million Zambian Kwacha. (Zambian 
Central Statistical Office, Financial Statistics of Government Sector.) Since there 
are insufficient data to enable proper calculation of the net flows between local 
government and PEs, it is hard to judge what the impact of including local 
government data would be. In South Africa the data at local government level 
are of a higher quality, although still incomplete. The gross operating surplus of 
PEs at the central government level was 15.1, 14.8 and 12.1 million South African 
Rand in 1988, 1989 and 1990 respectively, while the corresponding figures at local 
government level were roughly 8, 10 and 16% ofthose amounts respectively. The 
relative size of the PE sector at local government level is thus not insignificant 
and possibly increasing. 
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but had virtually regained its 1979-1980 levels by 1984. The PE sector seems, 
however, to have failed to create employment opportunities commensurate with 
this increased investment: Its share of formal sector employment was 43.4% in 
1980, but had fallen to 34.4% by 1983. It is obviously difficult to say what the 
effect of more labour-intensive techniques would have been on profitability, but, 
as we shall see in Section 6, the choice of relatively capital intensive techniques 
does not appear to have had a positive impact on the financial performance of 
PEs. 
In South Africa, the PE sector is much smaller, in relative terms, than that in 
Zambia. Its share of GDP fell steadily over the second half of the 1980s, from 
a high of 16.0% in 1984 to 11.5% in 1989. The sector's share in investment went 
from 16.6% in 1970 to 27.3% in 1980. It then fell off very sharply from 1981 
onwards, and by 1990 stood at 17.2%. These figures are consistent with a picture 
of "free enterprise" reforms in the 1980s, particularly in the second half of the 
decade. (See Section 9.) 
The number of PEs in Zimbabwe remained fairly constant over the 1980s. The 
PE sector is even smaller, in terms of size relative to the national economy, than 
that of South Africa. This result, which contradicts in one respect the 
Gerschenkronian thesis discussed in the second paragraph of Section 1, stems 
from the high degree of political commitment to the establishment of PEs by the 
National Party in South Africa. No comparable commitment existed in 
Zimbabwe, as mentioned in Section 3. The PE sector's contribution to GDP 
averaged 8.3% both for the period 1975 to 1978 and from 1984 to 1987, but 
dropped to 5.6% in the years 1980 to 1982. The share of the Zimbabwe PE 
sector in investment exhibits considerable fluctuations over time. In 1975 it stood 
at 17.5% and in 1988 was 15.7%, but during the period 1979 to 1981 it averaged 
8.6% and between 1982 and 1986 the average level was 26.9%. These numbers 
suggest that, aside from the stabilisation-induced contraction in government 
spending in the early 1980s (discussed in Section 9), no significant changes of 
government policy toward investment in PEs have taken place during the period 
for which we have data . As we shall see in Section 9, this is basically true, 
although the mild reforms that have occurred appear to have had a positive 
impact on financial performance. (See Section 6 in the latter regard.) 
The PE sector's share of GDP is very high in Zambia, compared to an 8.6% 
average for less developed countries ("LDCs") generally.19 South Africa and 
19Short, op. cit., p.1l8. 
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Zimbabwe, on the other hand, are not far off the average.20 Except to the extent 
mentioned in the paragraph above, the trends in the PE sectors' shares of GDP 
identified in the preceding three paragraphs tend to reinforce the 
Gerschenkronian expectations outlined in the second paragraph of Section 1. As 
far as the issues raised in the third paragraph of Section 1 are concerned, the 
numbers suggest that the industrialisation processes in both South Africa and 
Zimbabwe, and particularly in the former, are at a sufficiently mature stage for 
the PE sector's share in GDP to be falling off or at least to be remaining 
constant. In Zambia, this is not yet the case. Of course, it may well be that poor 
government policy is unnecessarily holding back attrition of the PE sector in all 
three countries, but especially so in Zambia. This is, as indicated in Section 1 
above, a difficult issue to resolve. Understanding of the issue can only be 
advanced by comparing performance of PEs with that of the private sectors in the 
Region in the manner suggested in the second paragraph of Section 6. 
6. Financial Performance of the PE Sector in the Region During the Last Two 
Decades 
The aggregate financial results for the Region's PE sectors are presented in Table 
Ill. The term "financial results" is defined for each country in the notes to Table 
Ill. Differences in accounting and tax systems, methods of funding, treatment of 
depreciation, inflation, subsidies and interest payments mean that the financial 
results across countries are not strictly comparable. Moreover, prices of inputs 
and outputs may be distorted, calling, in principle, for shadow pricing. Financial 
results, in other words, are influenced by deviations from market prices as well as 
by operating efficiency. Nonetheless, they constitute a sensible starting point for 
assessing the performance of PEs and especially trends therein over time. To 
enable some comparison of PE performance across countries, in this paper 
financial results have been measured as a percentage of GDP. 
Table IV could contain far more information if the relevant data were available. 
It is obviously very important to monitor PE performance, notably in the areas of 
financial profitability, returns to investment and wages, and the effectiveness of 
resources used. The scarcity of data necessary to construct these ratios hampers 
such monitoring. In particular, it has not been possible to construct liquidity 
ratios, such as a ratio of current assets to current liabilities. Similarly, there is 
virtually no information on the leverage of PEs in the Region. The Table 
attempts to provide information on performance of the PE sector and its use of 
resources at current (financial) cost. Leverage ratios measure levels of debt 
2OFor comparative purposes, note that PEs' share ofGDP in Britain was 7.8% 
in 1979 and 4.3% in 1986. (Matthew Bishop and John Kay, Does Privatization 
Work? Lessons from the U.K. (1988), p.5.) 
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financing. Profitability ratios measure the extent to which investments yield 
profits. Productivity ratios measure the effectiveness with which resources are 
employed. Ideally, we should have the same ratios for the private sector for 
comparative purposes, and policy makers should elicit these to make the necessary 
comparisons. Studies of other LDCs indicate that PEs are usually far less 
productive and profitable than private enterprises.21 
In Zambia, the PE sector made a loss equal to 3.5% of GDP in 1981, but by 1984 
was showing a profit equal to 7.4% of GDP. It should be noted that these data 
are only for the companies organised under ZIMCO. On the other hand, the 
ZIMCO group did account for 90% of the government's PE investment in the 
fiscal year 198822 and for 95% of PE turnover in the years 1980 to 1986.23 The 
data we have for Zambia indicate returns to investment and levels of leverage that 
compare favourably with those experienced by other countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.24 
In South Africa, the PE sector showed a gross operating surplus equal to 8.0% of 
GDP in 1985, but by 1989 this had shrunk to 6.4%. The ratio of financial results 
to investment shows generally improving performance for the period for which it 
is known, i.e. from 1985 onwards. It should also be noted that the ratio can 
sensibly be compared to that in Zimbabwe and bears testimony to far better 
performance in South Africa. There was very little change in the productivity of 
labour in South African PEs between 1985 and 1989. The ratio of PE value 
added to PE payroll costs ranged from 2.2 to 2.4 throughout. The ratio is 
comparable to that obtaining in countries like Niger and Senegal, but only about 
half the magnitude of that in Malawi.25 
The Zimbabwe PE sector experienced a significant drop in profits between 1978 
and 1982. The Zimbabwe Central Statistical Office attributed the sharp decline 
to "the unfavourable economic condition coupled with a loss of some skilled 
manpower after 1980 [the year of independence]."26 But by 1983 profits had 
21Studies quoted in Swanson & Wolde-Semait, op. cit. , p.69. 
22Ca\Culated from information on p.2 of the Report of the Zambian Auditor-
General for 1988 on the Accounts of Parastatal Bodies. 
23Swanson & Wolde-Semait, op. cit., p.35. 
24Ibid., pp.19-20. 
25 lbid., p.20. 
26Zimbabwe Central Statistical Office, 1985 Statistical Yearbook of Zimbabwe, 
p.102. 
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regained their 1978 level of 2.3% of GDP and by 1987 had reached 3.4% of GDP. 
The ratio of PE value added to PE payroll costs suggests declining productivity 
in the early 1980s and improvements thereafter, to the point where productivity 
levels were beginning to approach those seen in South Africa by 1987. Similarly, 
the ratio of financial results to investment reinforces the impression of poor 
results in the early 1980s and improving fortunes after 1982. 
One of the ratios in Table IV shows the relationship between the PE sector's 
share of GDP and its share of investment. This is the most interesting ratio, in 
a way, since it allows us not only to judge the effect of investment by PEs on the 
national economy, but also permits us to make direct comparisons both of 
performance by the PE sectors and of trends therein among the three countries 
of the Region. Figure A depicts graphically the changes in these ratios over time, 
using all the data we have. Figure B plots three year moving averages ofthe same 
data, thus removing annual kinks from the graph. In Figure C, the three year 
moving averages are plotted from 1982 (the first point in this data set for Zambia) 
to 1988 (the last point in the set for South Africa). In very general terms, Figure 
C shows South Africa performing best, followed from a clear distance by Zambia, 
with Zimbabwe far behind both. In terms of trends over the 1980s, South Africa 
displays improving performance and Zimbabwe has been picking itself up off the 
floor since about 1983, but the decline in Zambia has been fairly steady. 
7. Influence of the PE Sector in the Region on Government Finance and Credit 
Markets During the Last Two Decades 
PEs finance their losses and investments through direct financial transfers from 
government, and domestic and external borrowing. Profits generated by PEs are 
channelled back to these sources or reinvested in the PEs. There are also certain 
implicit flows between government and PEs. 
The financial results of PEs influence the level and composition of government 
expenditure, domestic credit and external debt. This occurs in at least three ways: 
(a) By creating a drain on government budgets through non-payment of taxes 
and requiring subsidies to meet capital and recurrent costs. In principle, the 
budgetary burdens imposed by PEs may be met by measures that reduce other 
government expenditure or increase government revenue, or they may be passed 
forward into higher government deficits and hence be financed by borrowing or 
money creation. Experience shows that there is a strong tendency for the 
budgetary burdens of PEs in fact to be passed forward and thus account in part 
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for high and rising government budget deficits in many LDCs.27 
(b) By straining the domestic credit system and requiring special access and 
preferential interest rates on loans that are then not always serviced. 
(c) By diverting capital away from investment in other areas of the economy 
that may be more profitable. Foreign borrowing by PEs causes particular 
problems because of its impact on the balance of payments. Such borrowing 
generally has less of an impact on economic stabilisation in the short term than 
government or bank finance. In LDCs, it is often used to purchase imported 
capital equipment and may therefore have little immediate effect on the overall 
balance of payments or domestic liquidity. The resulting debt burden can, 
however, be a major source of problems in the longer term, especially as 
repayments will have to be made in foreign exchange.28 
The information in Table V is aimed at measuring the impact of PEs on the 
government budget. It sets out estimates of net direct financial flows (excluding 
borrowing) between government and the PE sector in the Region. 
Estimates are available for South Africa only with respect to the financial year 
1989-90. They therefore tell us very little. For that particular year the impact of 
direct financial flows between PEs and government was very small relative to 
GDP. No statistics are available for Zimbabwe. 
In Zambia, net direct financial flows from government to the PE sector averaged 
3.2% of GDP for the period 1968 to 1970. This is a very large number, especially 
given that the PE sector was supposed to mobilise resources and contribute to 
government revenues. From 1980 to 1984 the net flow was actually in the 
opposite direction, to the tune of 1.1% of GDP on average. These figures do 
exclude borrowing and should be seen in the context that net lending (including 
net acquisition of securities) by the government to the PE sector averaged a 
massive 6.2% of GDP from 1978 to 1980.29 In 1988 government lending to 
ZIMCO alone was equal to 82% of total government expenditure and 237% of 
the budget deficit.30 Moreover, it may be that while direct government payments 
27Short, op. cit., p. 175. 
28See Short, op. cit. , p. 176. 
29CaIculated from information in Financial Statistics of Government Sector, 
published by the Zambian Central Statistical Office. 
30CaIculated from information in the IMF's 1991 Government Finance 
Statistics Yearbook and the Report of the Zambian Auditor-General for 1988 on 
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to PEs have been declining, they have been resurfacing through implicit flows such 
as government assumption of PE debt. There is in any event something rather 
peculiar about the nature and size of the flows between the government and 
ZIMCO. It is often argued that PEs are undercapitalised by governments. In the 
case of ZIMCO, the reverse seems, on the face of the figures, to be the case and 
it is far from easily explicable. We have already seen that the levels of 
government lending to the group of companies is very high. It is also the case 
that the government has made enormous equity investments in the companies. 
But, while the companies are apparently very profitable, we have also seen that 
their performance in servicing debt owed to the government is very poor. In 
addition, the Auditor-General consistently complains that the group does not pay 
sufficient dividends to the government, given the profits it makes.3! Certainly, 
it is peculiar that while ZIMCO retained profits equal to roughly 29% of GDP at 
31 March 198532, it distributed no dividends to the government during 198433 
and net direct transfers from ZIMCO to the government equalled only 3.1 % of 
GDP.34 For a group that probably accounted for over 50% of all investment in 
the economy that year3S, this was, incidentally, no startling performance. The 
puzzling aspect, however, is that there would have been a simple way for the 
government to increase its returns from ZIMCO: It could have started by not 
subscribing for shares worth 570 million Kwacha nor making "capital grants and 
contributions" of over 30 million Kwacha to the group during the year ended 31 
March 1985.36 Together, these amounts equalled 12% of Zambia 's GDP for 
the Accounts of Parastatal Bodies. 
31See, for example, the 1980 and 1984 Reports of the Zambian Auditor-
General on the Accounts of Parastatal Bodies. 
32Calculated from information on p.3 of the Report of the Zambian Auditor-
General for 1984 on the Accounts of Parastatal Bodies. 
33Report of the Zambian Auditor-General for 1984 on the Accounts of 
Parastatal Bodies, p.3. 
34See Table v. 
35Extrapolated from information in Table n. 
36Report of the Zambian Auditor-General for 1984 on the Accounts of 
Parastatal Bodies. It is clear from the 1984 Report that ZIMCO felt it necessary 
to be very conservative in declaring dividends at the time in order to shore up its 
liquidity position and to facilitate reinvestment in the group. It is equally clear 
that the government was of the view that more dividends should have been 
declared. It is, however, not apparent why the government did not adopt a 
tougher stance, possibly along the lines I have suggested. Moreover, the issue was 
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1984. 
Many flows between government and PEs are implicit and hence not represented 
in the calculations of direct financial flows. Implicit flows from government to 
PEs include the following: Unpaid taxes, dividends and transfers; prepaid goods 
and services not delivered; tax holidays; concessional financing rates; debt 
assumption. Implicit flows from PEs to government consist mainly of payment 
arrears which are never settled (like unpaid bills for the provision of electricity at 
government facilities) and un subsidised employment of redundant personnel or 
employment at artificially high wages under government directives. There is, 
however, insufficient information available to make meaningful calculations of 
these flows. It is usually assumed that such implicit flows operate largely in the 
direction of the PE secto~7 and they could significantly affect the results 
produced above. Take the case of Zambia, where the Auditor-General routinely 
complains that PEs fail to service their debts to the government. As at 31 
December 1983, for example, ZIMCO had piled up principal arrears of 9.8 million 
Kwacha and interest arrears of 41.5 million Kwacha.38 Together, these arrears 
were equal to an extraordinary 1.2% of Zambia's GDP. Moreover, the fact that 
information is generally unavailable on these flows is evidence of a lack of 
transparency and weak accounting and reporting procedures that undermine the 
credibility of the PE sector and impair efforts to improve its performance. 
Government transfers are not the only way that PEs finance their operations. 
They also borrow heavily from domestic and external sources to cover operating 
losses and to finance investments. Table VI sets out what limited information we 
have on the PE sector's share of domestic credit and external debt in the Region. 
Unfortunately, statistics are available only for Zambia. It should be noted that 
direct foreign loans to PEs do not include money "on-lent" by government. The 
external debt figure may thus provide only a partial picture of PE foreign 
borrowing. Certainly, it is thought that in Zambia a substantial difference exists 
between what PEs borrow directly and what government borrows or assumes on 
their behalf.39 
Financing from the domestic banking sector is important partly because increasing 
the share of PEs in total credit can have the effect of crowding out private sector 
not new: It had, for example, been raised in the Report of the Zambian Auditor-
General for 1980 on the Accounts of Parastatal Bodies. 
37See, for example, Swanson & Wolde-Semait, op. cit., p.12. 
38Report of the Zambian Auditor-General for 1984 on the Accounts of 
Parastatal Bodies, p.2. 
39Swanson & Wolde-Semait, op. cit. , p.17. 
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firms. The position is exacerbated when loans to the PE sector are poorly 
serviced, as is certainly the case in Zambia. Domestic public borrowing, by bond 
issues, can have similar crowding out effects. At least one study indicates a 
positive correlation between economic growth and the share of private sector 
credit in total domestic credit in selected African and Asian countries. The same 
study suggests that private enterprises use financial resources more efficiently than 
the public sector, and that saving ratios decline sharply wherever the government 
directly or indirectly determines the demand for domestic credit.40 
In Zambia, the PE sector's share of domestic credit went from 12.6% in 1980 to 
14.2% in 1984. Given the much larger share of the PE sector in GDP, crowding 
out in the domestic market does not seem to have been a major issue, although 
it is certainly unfortunate that the sector's share of domestic debt was rising at the 
same time as its share of GDP was falling. Of greater concern is the fact that the 
sector's share of external debt rose dramatically from 26.2% to 60.0% between 
1980 and 1986. PE external debt has thus been a significant factor in Zambia's 
external debt crisis.41 
8. The General Case for PE Reform 
By the late 1970s, the PE sector had absorbed a large share of governments' 
budgets in the form of subsidies and capital infusions. As governments ran into 
severe fiscal problems in the 1980s and loans became increasingly difficult to raise 
at home and abroad, they were forced to consider relatively radical methods for 
improving the performance of the PE sector. 
The root causes of poor PE performance can be seen as both external and 
internal.42 External factors include unfavourable export or import prices, limited 
access to markets and high interest rates.43 Internal factors include inappropriate 
40Study quoted on p.16 of Swanson & Wolde-Semait, op. cit.. 
41The country's total external debt stood at US$7.5 billion in 1991, which was 
twice GDP at the current exchange rate and probably much more at an 
equilibrium or market rate. (The World Bank, Trends in Developing Economies 
1991 (Washington, D.e. 1991), p.602.) 
42Swanson & Wolde-Semait, op. cit. , p.22. 
43 All of which were problems for the three countries in the Region for much 
of the 1980s. High nominal and real interest rates were obviously a feature of the 
international economic landscape from the end ofthe 1970s. Deteriorating barter 
terms of trade faced by many of the Region's commodities (notably, in this 
Page 18 
investment decisions, an adverse operating environment characterised by a weak 
capital base and price controls, and institutional impediments such as insufficient 
operating autonomy and poor accountability. Many PEs are engaged in projects 
not sufficiently appraised in terms of technical, economic and financial viability 
due to the absence of pre-investment cost-benefit analysis or due to non-economic 
considerations. At times, there is a lack of clear distinction between economic 
goals and social objectives in establishing PEs. Government interference with 
operational decisions of PEs is a common feature of the institutional impediments 
to their functioning efficiently. Managers are appointed according to criteria 
other than managerial skills. Moreover, they are constrained by a decision-making 
process that is politicised. Employee incentives are often suppressed by rigid wage 
guidelines. 
The 1980s saw governments introducing PE reform efforts to deal with some of 
these factors, including financial and physical restructuring and divestiture. These 
programmes have sometimes been supported by macroeconomic reform, involving 
price and import liberalisation and exchange rate realignment.44 Obviously, PEs 
operate in different environments and perform with varying degrees of success, 
so no single set of reform measures is appropriate for revitalising the PE sector. 
PE reform actions can be roughly grouped according to their purpose as 
follows45: 
(a) Macroeconomic policy reforms aim at providing a more appropriate policy 
framework for PEs through liberalisation of price controls and protective trade 
policies, elimination of state monopolies and revision of tariff structures and 
investment codes. These policies are designed to improve the competitive 
environment in which the public and private sectors co-exist. 
context, Zambian copper and Zimbabwean tobacco) during the 1980s reflected 
weak demand resulting from sluggish growth in the industrialised countries and 
other exogenous factors, such as the development of superior substitutes for 
copper. 
44Similar activity took place in countries around the world, including Britain, 
during the 1980s. Thjs reflected, in part, the powerful intellectual and political 
tides flowing against state involvement in the economy during the decade. These 
in turn were a response the stagflationary economic environment of the late 1970s, 
for wmch Keynesian economic management was held responsible in many 
quarters. International bodies such as the IMF and the World Bank helped this 
view along in Zambia and Zimbabwe, as we shall see in Section 9. In addition, 
there were domestic pressures for reform of the PE sector in all three countries 
in the Region. Again, these are discussed in Section 9. 
45Swanson & Wolde-Semait, op. cit., p.23. 
Page 19 
(b) Divestiture programmes aim at rationalising the PE sector through (i) 
liquidation and closing down of non-strategic, non-viable PEs, (ii) privatisation of 
non-essential PEs, and (iii) introduction of management contracts for viable 
enterprises where government wishes to retain ownership or is unable to find 
buyers. 
(c) Rehabilitation aims at resuscitating viable PEs through physical and 
financial restructuring, revenue and expense alignment, information management 
and personnel training programmes. Financial restructuring aims at restoring a 
sound basis for PEs through cancellation of cross debts between various economic 
agents, stricter budgetary discipline (including limits on subsidies and timely 
payment of government bills) and tighter credit policies. 
(d) Management reform aims at introducing management tools such as regular 
and standardised auditing, accounting, procurement and personnel policy. At the 
national level, these reforms consist in improving the flow of information between 
government and PEs. 
(e) Legal and institutional reform aims at reVlsmg the legal framework 
governing PEs and introducing new institutional arrangements so as to achieve (i) 
more effective government monitoring, (ii) a stronger role for the board of 
directors, (iii) better relationships between government and managers through 
performance contracts, monetary incentives and performance evaluation, and (iv) 
increased autonomy and better definition of managerial accountability. 
The case for divestiture rests principally on two arguments: (i) Some PEs should 
not have been created in the first place because, for example, the country has no 
comparative advantage in producing their output or the capacity created has not 
been well adapted to local demand and supply conditions. If the government 
cannot sell such PEs, it should liquidate them. (ii) The state is a poor 
entrepreneur. Even if a PE is covering its costs or providing a return on its 
capital, the opportunity cost of that capital is high and it could be producing a 
higher return elsewhere. There are, however, some industries (e.g. utilities) where 
for economic, political or strategic reasons privatisation has not been on the 
agenda. Here the aim is to provide a system of incentives that will reward 
improvements in efficiency. Allowing private firms to compete in the market is 
often an important element of this strategy. 
9. Reform of the PE Sector in the Region During the 1980s 
The deterioration ofthe Zambian economy referred to in Section 3 reached crisis 
proportions in 1982, when trade credits to the country were suspended. Attempts 
were made during the 1982-88 period to restructure the economy. These were, 
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however, largely ineffective, due to weak implementation capacity and lack of 
consensus in Zambia over the need for adjustment and over what type of reform 
measures were required.46 
As early as 1979 there was talk of reorganising ZIMCO with the aim of "making 
the company increase its contribution to the country's economy."47 In 1984 the 
Auditor-General reported "weaknesses in internal controls obtaining in these 
organisations [i.e., PEs]. It was also evident that the line of controls is not clearly 
defined in as far as the functions of the boards of directors and Government 
ministries and departments are related."48 In 1985 and 1986 Zambia was granted 
Sector Adjustment Loans by the World Bank to assist it in its efforts to reform 
the PE sector.49 In 1988 the Auditor-General was still reporting weaknesses in 
internal controls, including "poor credit control systems; inadequate purchasing 
procedures; lack of adequate information systems; inadequate safeguards against 
loss of property and cash through thefts; lack of proper guidelines on replacement 
of fixed assets; etc ... " The Auditor-General went on to observe that there was 
"lack of co-ordination between the various sister companies in the Parastatal 
Sector and there was a general tendency of the organisations to enter into costly 
ventures which resulted into heavy losses. Although the performance of the 
Parastatal Sector improved due to the liberal pricing policy, some organisations, 
however, operated on depleted working capital and because of the previous 
accumulated losses, the shareholders' funds were, in most cases, in deficit."so 
The Zambian reform programme does not appear to have been very far reaching. 
Between 1983 and 1987, Zambia completed only one privatisation and six 
management contracts. It had achieved no liquidations, had no PEs under study 
for divestiture and had performed no other rehabilitations.51 The number of PEs 
actually increased substantially between 1980 and 1989. The net effect, as we 
have seen, was that the Zambian PE sector exhibited declining performance as the 
1980s proceeded. 
~rends in Developing Economies 1990, op. cit., p.61O. 
47Report of the Zambian Auditor-General for 1980 on the Accounts of 
Parastatal Bodies, p.l. 
48Report of the Zambian Auditor-General for 1984 on the Accounts of 
Parastatal Bodies, p.l. 
49Swanson and Wolde-Semait, op. cit., p.34. 
50Report of the Zambian Auditor-General for 1988 on the Accounts of 
Parastatal Bodies, p.l. 
51Swanson & Wolde-Semait, op. cit. , p.53. 
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Faced with a seriously declining economic situation, the government decided in 
late 1988 that policy changes were required. It initiated discussions and 
subsequently agreed with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(the "IMF') on a revised adjustment programme.52 The industrial strategy of the 
government pursuant to this programme envisages an enhanced role for the 
private sector. Measures aimed at divesting the ownership and management of 
many PEs have been initiated to promote competition, reduce the managerial 
burden on the government, and enlarge the scope for private sector activities. In 
May 1990 the Zambian government announced its intention to sell to the public 
up to 49% of its shares in many PEs. In the 1991 budget speech, the Minister of 
Finance stated that the ultimate goal of the government is to sell outright or at 
least transfer majority ownership of all PEs except public utilities and other 
"strategic" industries. The government has established a committee to develop 
mechanisms for implementing this policy initiativeY 
Even with an enhanced role for the private sector, PEs will continue to play a 
major role in the economy. Therefore, work has begun on the second phase of 
the PE reform programme. The relationship between ZIMCO and its subsidiaries 
is to be examined to ensure that they do not impair the effective operations of the 
subsidiaries and an economic and financial review of 14 of the poorer performing 
PEs is to be undertaken. Recommendations on ways to improve the performance 
of these firms are to be made, including possible financial and organisational 
restructuring, managerial changes, taking on joint venture partners, etc .. In those 
cases where a firm is economically unviable, actions to divest or close down the 
operation either partially or fully are expected.54 It can only be hoped that the 
programme will gather momentum in time. 
Most PEs in Zimbabwe were inherited from the colonial period and have not 
been significantly restructured.ss The reform process in Zimbabwe started as 
early as 1980, with the liquidation of several PEs and the consolidation of 
others.56 By the second half of 1981 Zimbabwe was also being urged to take on 
52Trends in Developing Economies 1990, op. cit., p.61O. 
53Trends in Developing Economies 1991, op. cit., p.601. 
s4Trends in Developing Economies 1990, op. cit. , p.612. 
55 Rob Davies, "The Transition to Socialism in Zimbabwe: Some Areas for 
Debate" in Colin Stoneman (ed.), Zimbabwe's Prospects: Issues of Race, Class 
and State in Southern Africa (1988), p.23. 
56Zimbabwe Central Statistical Office, 1985 Statistical Yearbook of Zimbabwe, 
p.91. 
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board items from the IMF's usual stabilisation package, partly as a result of over-
ambitious development plans (which resulted in both internal budget deficits and 
external payments deficits), partly because of the worsening trade climate, and 
partly because of South Africa's restriction of Zimbabwean transit trade. By early 
1983 Zimbabwe had agreed a programme involving a loan of $375 million from 
the IMF.s7 Meanwhile, the World Bank produced several studies on the 
Zimbabwean economy, particularly on the industrial sector. Its findings on the 
efficiency of Zimbabwean industries were often quite favourable, but some were 
adjudged extremely inefficient, although subsequent recalculations by the World 
Bank showed that certain major companies in the latter category, like the 
Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company ("Zisco") were in fact considerably more 
efficient than thought at first.s8 Perhaps this ambivalence has been partly 
responsible for the fact that consumer subsidies have been tackled with 
"disproportionate aggressiveness", as opposed to the operating losses of PEs, 
although the power of vested interests is probably at least as important in 
explaining the small scale of the PE reform programme.59 Nonetheless, the 
programme apparently bore fruit in improved performance from about 1983 
onwards. 
A poor overall economic climate in South Africa and the state's weak fiscal 
position in the 1980s encouraged moves towards lower state spending, 
privatisation of government functions, self-funding government services, and so 
on.60 In 1985, the South African government published a White Paper on 
privatisation and deregulation. It contained the following views: "Owing 
especially to the statutory provisions in terms of which public corporations and 
State business enterprises are operated, and the fact that their mandates do not 
necessarily take into account all the economic implications of such activities, they 
are not always managed on the basis of profit and return on capital to the same 
extent as private sector undertakings. They can obtain loans against government 
guarantees, and therefore they are not necessarily geared to achieving the optimal 
S7Colin Stoneman, 'The Economy: Recognising the Reality" in Colin Stoneman 
(ed.), Zimbabwe's Prospects: Issues of Race, Class and State in Southern Africa 
(1988), p.55. 
58Stoneman, op. cit., p.57. 
s90bert I. Nyawata, "Macroeconomic Management, Adjustment and 
Stabilisation" in Colin Stoneman (ed.), Zimbabwe's Prospects: Issues of Race, 
Class and State in Southern Africa (1988), p.110. 
~.c. Moll, '''Probably the Best Laager in the World': the Record and 
Prospects of the South African Economy" in John D. Brewer (ed.), Can South 
Africa Survive? Five Minutes to Midnight (1989), p.155. 
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utilisation of capital. They also do not make a contribution to tax revenue." The 
White Paper went on to argue that the financing needs of PEs, amongst other 
factors, were crowding out private investment. 
Early in 1988 the South African government created the Office for Public 
Enterprises and Privatisation to oversee a systematic programme of privatisation 
and "commercialisation" of PEs. Several large PEs, including Sasol (fuel 
products), Iscor (iron and steel) and National Sorghum Breweries have been 
privatised. Other PEs are subject to commercialisation, which involves bringing 
incentive structures in line with those prevailing in the private sector in an effort 
to produce similar levels of performance. These PEs include Escom (electricity), 
Transnet (airlines, railways, harbours, road transport and oil pipeline), Foskor 
(mining), Sapos (postal services) and Telkom (telecommunications). As we have 
seen, the PE sector has shown improvements in performance in the 1980s, but 
data do not exist to assess the impact of the more extensive reform programme 
launched in 1988. 
10. Conclusions 
I have expressed considerable misgivings about the quality of data available for 
use in this paper (where they have been available at all). Similarly, the 
comparability of much of the data is questionable, making cross-country 
comparisons difficult. A basic conclusion is therefore that data collection in the 
Region must be considerably enhanced. It seems that both South Africa and 
Zimbabwe have recently taken some (though clearly not adequate) steps in this 
direction. Perversely, the quality of data in Zambia has deteriorated over the 
period under consideration. 
Despite the statistical shortcomings, it is clear that PEs have been of considerable 
economic significance in the Region over the last two decades. In alI three 
countries, they have contributed significant proportions of aggregate output and 
investment. In Zambia, their impact on the economy has been enormous. They 
have operated in virtualIy alI kinds of economic activity and have been prominent 
in key sectors of the Region's economies. It is therefore essential that the 
governments of these countries carefully monitor and evaluate the performance 
of PEs in future. 
It is also clear that the surpluses of PEs have been small in relation to the 
resources invested in them. In some years, in Zambia, the PE sector has actualIy 
been running a deficit Moreover, net direct transfers from the PE sector to 
government have occasionally been negative in Zambia and the suspicion must be 
that if implicit flows from government to PEs were properly accounted for (an 
impossible exercise given the state of the data), this pattern would be reinforced. 
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The budgetary burden of PEs in South Africa and Zimbabwe is impossible to 
judge in the absence of sufficient data but their financial results, as already stated, 
have been unimpressive. As a result, PEs have made sizeable demands on 
government budgets, bank credit, and foreign borrowing. It is, however, clear 
from even our limited data that the PE sectors in South Africa and Zimbabwe 
have performed considerably better than their counterparts elsewhere in Africa 
(including Zambia). This is a picture one does not get from the "Africa-wide 
studies cited in Section 2. The data also suggest that the PE sector reform 
programmes in these two countries have improved financial performance in recent 
years. Such achievements should be applauded. Domestic and international 
efforts in this context should build on these successes and ensure that they are not 
reversed. In particular, the temptation to expand public sector employment in 
post-Apartheid South Africa will have to be resisted. This can only be done if the 
private sector is growing at a healthy rate. 
Certain issues fall clearly outside the scope of this paper, but are related and 
require further thought. The first is that the standard financial indicators referred 
to in Section 6 may not always be appropriate for measuring the success of PEs. 
This does not mean that they should be disregarded. On the contrary, as 
suggested in Section 1, they are a very useful starting point and the information 
necessary for their calculation should certainly be systematically collected by PEs. 
In fact, it means that even more information must be gathered. PEs that are 
required to meet non-economic targets should be fully apprised of the nature of 
those targets, which should be quantified and capable of measurement. In other 
words, it is not necessarily the case that PEs must "be evaluated like private 
enterprises, but rather, that like private enterprises, they must be evaluated."61 
The second is that while aggregate analyses of the kind undertaken in this paper 
are obviously crucial for making sector-wide judgments, it is vital that micro-level 
studies be made of individual PEs in the Region. It is particularly important to 
make such studies of the larger PEs that have been the subjects of various reform 
efforts, in order to evaluate those reforms and discriminate among them. 
61Leroy P. lones, "Performance Evaluation for State-Owned Enterprises" in 
Ravi Ramamurti and Raymond Yernon (eds.), Privatization and Control of State-
Owned Enterprises (Washington, D.e. 1991), p.182. 
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11 Table I: Principal Industries in Which PEs are Engaged 
South Mrica 
1990 Mining and quarrying; manufacturing; electricity, gas and 
water; commerce and catering; transport and 
communication; community services. (a) 
Zambia 
1980-82 Hotels; railways; bus and other land transport; airlines; 
water transport; posts and telecommunications; housing. 
(b) 
Zimbabwe 
1980 Agriculture; mining; manufacturing; electricity; 
distribution; transport and communications; services. (c) 
1991 Agriculture; mining; manufacturing; electricity; 
distribution; transport; services; health. (c) 
Notes to Table I 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
Non-financial PEs. Source: South African Central Statistical Service. 
Source: Short. 
Non-financial PEs. Source: Zimbabwe Central Statistical Office. 

Table 11: Number of PEs and Contribution to GDP, Investment and 
Employment 
Number % ofGDP %of %of 
Investment Employment 
South Africa 
1970 16.6 (a) 
1971 16.4 (a) 
1972 18.0 (a) 
1973 16.0 (a) 
1974 16.8 (a) 
1975 25 Cb) 19.2 (a) 
1976 13.7 (c) 19.0 (a) 
1977 14.5 (c) 22.0 (a) 
1978 15.2 (c) 25.4 (a) 
1979 14.7 (c) 26.8 (a) 
1980 12.5 (c) 27.3 (a) 
1981 13.4 (c) 21.1 (a) 
1982 28 (d) 13.4 (c) 18.8 (a) 
1983 15.1 (c) 18.2 (a) 
1984 26 (b) 16.0 (c) 18.9 (a) 
1985 14.1 (e) 21.5 (a) 
1986 14.1 (e) 19.8 (a) 
1987 13.5 (e) 17.0 (a) 
1988 13.1 (e) 14.4 (a) 
1989 11.5 (e) 16.5 (a) 
1990 17.2 (a) 
Zambia 
1972 37.8 (t) 49.7 (g) 
1977 113 (b) 
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Table n: Number of PEs and Contribution to GDP, Investment and 
Employment 
Number % ofGDP %of %of 
Investment Employment 
1979·80 61.2 (g) 
1980 (k) 54.8 (g) 43.4 (h) 
1981 (k) 35.0 (i) 49.6 (j) 37.0 (h) 
1982 134 (b) 26.8 (i)(k) 50.0 (j)(k) 34.1 (h)(k) 
1983 (k) 30.9 (i) 58.8 (j) 34.4 (h) 
1984 31.5 (i)(k) 57.2 (j)(k) 
1985 137 (b) 35.0 (i)(k) 
Zimbabwe 
1975 7.8 (I) 17.5 (m) 
1976 8.7 (I) 18.3 (m) 
1977 8.4 (I) 14.8 (m) 
1978 8.3 (I) 11.4 (m) 
1979 7.4 (I) 7.1 (m) 
1980 28 (n) 5.8 (I) 8.7 (m) 
1981 5.3 (I) 9.9 (m) 
1982 5.7 (I) 26.5 (m) 
1983 9.6 (I) 31.0 (m) 
1984 10.3 (I) 24.3 (m) 
1985 6.5 (I) 28.1 (m) 
1986 24 (b) 6.6 (I) 24.4 (m) 
1987 9.9 (I) 17.4 (m) 
1988 15.7 (m) 
1991 29 (n) 
Page ii 
Notes to Table IT 
(a) Share of public corporations in gross domestic fixed investment. Source: 
Calculated from figures provided by the South African Reserve Bank. 
(b) Non-financial PEs. Source: IMF, Government Statistics Yearbooks. 
(c) Value added by PEs (including the enterprise departments of local 
authorities) to GDP at factor incomes, as a percentage of GDP. Source: 
Calculated from figures provided by the South African Central Statistical 
Service. 
(d) Non-financial public corporations. Source: Zimbabwe Central 
Statistical Office, 1985 Statistical Yearbook of Zimbabwe. 
(e) Gross value added by public corporations as a percentage ofGDP. Source: 
Calculated from figures provided by the South African Central Statistical 
Service. 
(f) At factor cost. Source: Short. 
(g) Share in gross domestic capital formation. Source: Short. 
(h) PE employmentITotal formal sector employment. 
(i) PE gross value added/GDP at market prices. 
U) PE gross investmentITotal gross domestic investment. Estimated on basis 
of net financial resources available to ZIMCO. 
(k) Non-financial PEs. Source: Swanson and Wolde-Semait. 
(I) Wages and salaries of non-financial public corporations plus gross operating 
surplus of non-financial public corporations, as a percentage of GDP. 
Source: Zimbabwe Central Statistical Office, National Income and 
Expenditure Report 1990. 
(m) Gross fixed capital formation by Non-financial PEs as a percentage of total 
gross fixed capital formation. Source: Zimbabwe Central Statistical Office, 
National Income and Expenditure Report 1990. 
(n) Non-financial PEs. Source: Zimbabwe Central Statistical Office. 
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Table ill: Aggregate Financial Results of PE Sectors 
Local Currency % ofGDP 
(a) 
South Africa (b) 
1985 9,900 8.0% 
1986 11,731 8.3% 
1987 12,623 7.7% 
1988 15,112 7.6% 
1989 14,766 6.4% 
Zambia 
1980 (c) 29.7 0.97 
1981 (c) -122.6 -3.52 
1982 (c) -77.8 -2.16 
1983 (c) 193.0 4.62 
1984 (c) 348.8 7.07 
1988 (d) 4,492 20 
Zimbabwe (e) 
1975 44 2.2 
1976 54 2.5 
1977 50 2.3 
1978 55 2.3 
1979 51 1.8 
1980 15 0.4 
1981 48 1.1 
1982 65 1.3 
1983 145 2.3 
1984 191 3.0 
1985 72 1.0 
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Table ID: Aggregate Financial Results of PE Sectors 
1986 
1987 
1988 
Notes to Table III 
Local Currency 
(a) 
213 
307 
400 
% ofGDP 
2.7 
3.4 
(a) Millions of Zambian Kwacha. Millions of South African Rand. Millions 
of Zimbabwe Dollars. 
(b) Gross operating surplus of central government PEs. The 1989 figures 
exclude certain privatised industries, notably Iscor and Sasol. Source: South 
African Central Statistical Service. 
(c) ZIMCO only. Net financial results are profits less losses, where profits and 
losses are defined before transfers, subsidies and taxes, after interest and 
depreciation. Source: Swanson and Wolde-Semait. 
(d) ZIMCO profits before tax and after exchange losses. Source: Report of the 
Auditor-General for 1988 on the Accounts of Parastatal Bodies. 
(e) Gross operating surplus of Non-financial PEs. Source: Zimbabwe Central 
Statistical Office, National Income and Expenditure Report 1990. 
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Table IV: Leverage, Profitability and Productivity Ratios for the 
PE Sector 
Total Debt/ % ofGDP/ Financial Value 
Net Worth % of Results/ Added! 
Investment Investment Payroll 
(a) Costs 
South Africa 
1985 0.66 1.6 (b) 2.3 (c) 
1986 0.71 2.06 (b) 2.4 (c) 
1987 0.79 2.35 (b) 2.2 (c) 
1988 0.91 2.66 (b) 2.4 (c) 
1989 0.70 1.84 (b) 2.3 (c) 
Zambia 
1972 0.76 
1980-84 0.21 (d) 
1980-86 0.38 (e) 
1981 0.71 
1982 0.54 
1983 0.53 
1984 0.55 
Zimbabwe 
1975 0.45 0.54 (f) 1.46 (g) 
1976 0.48 0.69 (f) 1.59 (g) 
1977 0.57 0.89 (f) 1.44 (g) 
1978 0.73 1.41 (f) 1.42 (g) 
1979 1.04 1.82 (f) 1.38 (g) 
1980 0.67 0.33(f) 1.07 (g) 
1981 0.54 0.59 (f) 1.16 (g) 
1982 0.22 0.24 (f) 1.16 (g) 
1983 0.31 0.38(f) 1.93 (g) 
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Table IV: Leverage, Profitability and Productivity Ratios for the 
PE Sector 
Total Debt/ % ofGDP/ Financial Value 
Net Worth %of Results/ Added! 
Investment Investment Payroll 
(a) Costs 
1984 0.42 0.66 (f) 2.03 (g) 
1985 0.23 0.23 (f) 1.18 (g) 
1986 0.27 0.67 (f) 1.26 (g) 
1987 0.57 1.05 (f) 2.00 (g) 
Notes to Table IV 
(a) From information in Table 11. 
(b) Gross operating surplus of central government PEs expressed as a ratio to 
gross fixed capital formation by public corporations. Source: South African 
Central Statistical Service. 
(c) Gross value added by central government PEsIRemuneration of 
labour by central government PEs. Source: Calculated from figures 
provided by the South African Central Statistical Service. 
(d) Financial results expressed as a ratio to investment. Source: Swanson and 
Wolde-Semait. 
(e) Total of medium and long term domestic and external debt expressed as a 
ratio to net assets. Source: Swanson and Wolde-Semait. 
(f) Gross operating surplus of Non-financial PEs expressed as a ratio to gross 
fixed capital formation by Non-financial PEs. Source: Zimbabwe Central 
Statistical Office, National Income and Expenditure Report 1990. 
(g) Gross value added by non-financial public corporations expressed as a ratio 
to wages and salaries of non-financial public corporations. Source: 
Zimbabwe Central Statistical Office, National Income and Expenditure 
Report 1990. 
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~ V, N., 0; ... " Fin.nd., Flow, r,om Go,unm •• ' 10 p", 
PEs to Government) 
Local Currency %ofGDP 
(a) 
I So.,. Af"" 
1989/90 (b) I (81) I (0.03) I 
Zambia 
1968 11.6 (c) 1.1 
1969 23.5 (c) 1.8 
1970 10.7 (c) 0.9 
1971 62.6 (c) 5.3 
1972 14.9 (c) 1.1 
1978 49.6 (c) 2.2 
1979 138.8 (c) 5.2 
1980 237.2 (c) 7.7 
1981 (d) (2.5) (0.1) 
1982 (d) 66.1 1.8 
1983 (d) (119.2) (2.9) 
1984 (d) (154.1 ) (3.1 ) 
Notes to Table V 
(a) Millions of South African Rand. Millions of Zambian Kwacha. 
(b) Interest paid by PEs to central government minus subsidies and capital 
transfers from central government to PEs. Source: South African Central 
Statistical Service. 
(c) Interest payments to and from public corporations, subsidies to public 
corporations, current transfers to and from public corporations, capital 
transfers to and from public corporations. Central government only. 
Source: Zambian Central Statistical Office, Financial Statistics of 
Government Sector. 
(d) Government payments to PEs less PE payments to government. Source: 
Swanson and Wolde-Semait. 

Table VI: Share of Public Enterprises in Domestic Credit and External 
Debt 
% of Domestic Credit % of External Debt 
Zambia 
1980 (a) 12.6 (b) 26.2 (c) 
1981 (a) 29.2 (c) 
1982 (a) 15.5 (b) 31.9 (c) 
1983 (a) 16.1 (b) 30.2 (c) 
1984 (a) 14.2 (b) 37.2 (c) 
1985 (a) 54.6 (c) 
1986 (a) 60.0 (c) 
1980-86 (a) 14.6 (b) 38.5 (c) 
Notes to Table VI 
(a) Non-financial PEs. Definition does not include financial PEs or public 
agencies. Source: Swanson and Wolde-Semait. 
(b) PE domestic credit outstandingfTotal domestic credit (Claims on 
government (net), Non-financial PEs, the private sector and financial 
institutions). 
(c) PE external debt outstanding/Official external debt outstanding. 

Table VD: GDP (a) 
South Mrica Zambia (c) Z· .L.L 
(b) 
1968 1,062 
1969 1,314 
1970 12,908 1,219 1,080 
1971 14,245 1,181 1,244 
1972 16,105 1,348 1,419 
1973 19,918 1,591 1,553 
1974 24,472 1,888 1,861 
1975 27,454 1,583 1,998 
1976 30,800 1,896 2,166 
1977 34,120 1,986 2,198 
1978 39,297 2,251 2,359 
1979 46,698 2,660 2,822 
1980 63,237 3,064 3,441 
1981 71,080 3,485 4,433 
1982 80,531 3,595 5,197 
1983 91,457 4,181 6,306 
1984 107,221 4,931 6,404 
1985 123,126 7,072 7,019 
1986 142,135 12,963 7,902 
1987 164,524 19,632 8,928 
1988 198,110 22,495 
1989 232,532 
1990 262,650 
Notes to Table VD 
(a) Current prices. Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
(b) Millions of South African Rand. 
(c) Millions of Zambian Kwacha. 
(d) Millions of Zimbabwe Dollars. 
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